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This PR introduces a feature designed to allow CloudStack to manage a generic volume encryption setting. The encryption is handled transparently to the guest OS, and is intended to handle VM guest data encryption at rest and possibly over the wire, though the actual encryption implementation is up to the primary storage driver. In some cases cloud customers may still prefer to maintain their own guest-level volume encryption, if they don't trust the cloud provider. However, for private cloud cases this greatly simplifies the guest OS experience in terms of running volume encryption for guests without the user having to manage keys, deal with key servers and guest booting being dependent on network connectivity to them (i.e. Tang), etc, especially in cases where users are attaching/detaching data disks and moving them between VMs occasionally. The feature can be thought of as having two parts - the API/control plane (which includes scheduling aspects), and the storage driver implementation. This initial PR adds the encryption setting to disk offerings and service offerings (for root volume), and implements encryption support for KVM SharedMountPoint, NFS, Local, and ScaleIO storage pools. NOTE: While not required, operations can be significantly sped up by ensuring that hosts have the `rng-tools` package and service installed and running on the management server and hypervisors. For EL hosts the service is `rngd` and for Debian it is `rng-tools`. In particular, the use of SecureRandom for generating volume passphrases can be slow if there isn't a good source of entropy. This could affect testing and build environments, and otherwise would only affect users who actually use the encryption feature. If you find tests or volume creates blocking on encryption, check this first. ### Management Server ##### API * createDiskOffering now has an 'encrypt' Boolean * createServiceOffering now has an 'encryptroot' Boolean. The 'root' suffix is added here in case there is ever any other need to encrypt something related to the guest configuration, like the RAM of a VM. This has been refactored to deal with the new separation of service offering from disk offering internally. * listDiskOfferings shows encryption support on each offering, and has an encrypt boolean to choose to list only offerings that do or do not support encryption * listServiceOfferings shows encryption support on each offering, and has an encrypt boolean to choose to list only offerings that do or do not support encryption * listHosts now shows encryption support of each hypervisor host via `encryptionsupported` * Volumes themselves don't show encryption on/off, rather the offering should be referenced. This follows the same pattern as other disk offering based settings such as the IOPS of the volume. ##### Volume functions A decent effort has been made to ensure that the most common volume functions have either been cleanly supported or blocked. However, for the first release it is advised to mark this feature as *experimental*, as the code base is complex and there are certainly edge cases to be found. Many of these features could eventually be supported over time, such as creating templates from encrypted volumes, but the effort and size of the change is already overwhelming. Supported functions: * Data Volume create * VM root volume create * VM root volume reinstall * Offline volume snapshot/restore * Migration of VM with storage (e.g. local storage VM migration) * Resize volume * Detach/attach volume Blocked functions: * Online volume snapshot * VM snapshot w/memory * Scheduled snapshots (would fail when VM is running) * Disk offering migration to offerings that don't have matching encryption * Creating template from encrypted volume * Creating volume from encrypted volume * Volume extraction (would we decrypt it first, or expose the key? Probably the former). ##### Primary Storage Support For storage developers, adding encryption support involves: 1. Updating the `StoragePoolType` for your primary storage to advertise encryption support. This is used during allocation of storage to match storage types that support encryption to storage that supports it. 2. Implementing encryption feature when your `PrimaryDataStoreDriver` is called to perform volume lifecycle functions on volumes that are requesting encryption. You are free to do what your storage supports - this could be as simple as calling a storage API with the right flag when creating a volume. Or (as is the case with the KVM storage types), as complex as managing volume details directly at the hypervisor host. The data objects passed to the storage driver will contain volume passphrases, if encryption is requested. ##### Scheduling For the KVM implementations specified above, we are dependent on the KVM hosts having support for volume encryption tools. As such, the hosts `StartupRoutingCommand` has been modified to advertise whether the host supports encryption. This is done via a probe during agent startup to look for functioning `cryptsetup` and support in `qemu-img`. This is also visible via the listHosts API and the host details in the UI. This was patterned after other features that require hypervisor support such as UEFI. The `EndPointSelector` interface and `DefaultEndpointSelector` have had new methods added, which allow the caller to ask for endpoints that support encryption. This can be used by storage drivers to find the proper hosts to send storage commands that involve encryption. Not all volume activities will require a host to support encryption (for example a snapshot backup is a simple file copy), and this is the reason why the interface has been modified to allow for the storage driver to decide, rather than just passing the data objects to the EndpointSelector and letting the implementation decide. VM scheduling has also been modified. When a VM start is requested, if any volume that requires encryption is attached, it will filter out hosts that don't support encryption. ##### DB Changes A volume whose disk offering enables encryption will get a passphrase generated for it before its first use. This is stored in the new 'passphrase' table, and is encrypted using the CloudStack installation's standard configured DB encryption. A field has been added to the volumes table, referencing this passphrase, and a foreign key added to ensure passphrases that are referenced can't be removed from the database. The volumes table now also contains an encryption format field, which is set by the implementer of the encryption and used as it sees fit. #### KVM Agent For the KVM storage pool types supported, the encryption has been implemented at Qemu itself, using the built-in LUKS storage support. This means that the storage remains encrypted all the way to the VM process, and decrypted before the block device is visible to the guest. This may not be necessary in order to implement encryption for /your/ storage pool type, maybe you have a kernel driver that decrypts before the block device on the system, or something like that. However, it seemed like the simplest, common place to terminate the encryption, and provides the lowest surface area for decrypted guest data. For qcow2 based storage, `qemu-img` is used to set up a qcow2 file with LUKS encryption. For block based (currently just ScaleIO storage), the `cryptsetup` utility is used to format the block device as LUKS for data disks, but `qemu-img` and its LUKS support is used for template copy. Any volume that requires encryption will contain a passphrase ID as a byte array when handed down to the KVM agent. Care has been taken to ensure this doesn't get logged, and it is cleared after use in attempt to avoid exposing it before garbage collection occurs. On the agent side, this passphrase is used in two ways: 1. In cases where the volume experiences some libvirt interaction it is loaded into libvirt as an ephemeral, private secret and then referenced by secret UUID in any libvirt XML. This applies to things like VM startup, migration preparation, etc. 2. In cases where `qemu-img` needs to use this passphrase for volume operations, it is written to a `KeyFile` on the cloudstack agent's configured tmpfs and passed along. The `KeyFile` is a `Closeable` and when it is closed, it is deleted. This allows us to try-with-resources any volume operations and get the KeyFile removed regardless. In order to support the advanced syntax required to handle encryption and passphrases with `qemu-img`, the `QemuImg` utility has been modified to support the new `--object` and `--image-opts` flags. These are modeled as `QemuObject` and `QemuImageOptions`. These `qemu-img` flags have been designed to supersede some of the existing, older flags being used today (such as choosing file formats and paths), and an effort could be made to switch over to these wholesale. However, for now we have instead opted to keep existing functions and do some wrapping to ensure backward compatibility, so callers of `QemuImg` can choose to use either way. It should be noted that there are also a few different Enums that represent the encryption format for various purposes. While these are analogous in principle, they represent different things and should not be confused. For example, the supported encryption format strings for the `cryptsetup` utility has `LuksType.LUKS` while `QemuImg` has a `QemuImg.PhysicalDiskFormat.LUKS`. Some additional effort could potentially be made to support advanced encryption configurations, such as choosing between LUKS1 and LUKS2 or changing cipher details. These may require changes all the way up through the control plane. However, in practice Libvirt and Qemu currently only support LUKS1 today. Additionally, the cipher details aren't required in order to use an encrypted volume, as they're stored in the LUKS header on the volume there is no need to store these elsewhere. As such, we need only set the one encryption format upon volume creation, which is persisted in the volumes table and then available later as needed. In the future when LUKS2 is standard and fully supported, we could move to it as the default and old volumes will still reference LUKS1 and have the headers on-disk to ensure they remain usable. We could also possibly support an automatic upgrade of the headers down the road, or a volume migration mechanism. Every version of cryptsetup and qemu-img tested on variants of EL7 and Ubuntu that support encryption use the XTS-AES 256 cipher, which is the leading industry standard and widely used cipher today (e.g. BitLocker and FileVault). Signed-off-by: Marcus Sorensen <mls@apple.com> Co-authored-by: Marcus Sorensen <mls@apple.com>
Apache CloudStack 
Apache CloudStack is open source software designed to deploy and manage large networks of virtual machines, as a highly available, highly scalable Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud computing platform. CloudStack is used by a number of service providers to offer public cloud services, and by many companies to provide an on-premises (private) cloud offering, or as part of a hybrid cloud solution.
CloudStack is a turnkey solution that includes the entire "stack" of features most organizations want with an IaaS cloud: compute orchestration, Network-as-a-Service, user and account management, a full and open native API, resource accounting, and a first-class User Interface (UI).
CloudStack currently supports the most popular hypervisors: VMware vSphere, KVM, XenServer, XenProject and Hyper-V as well as OVM and LXC containers.
Users can manage their cloud with an easy to use Web interface, command line tools, and/or a full-featured query based API.
For more information on Apache CloudStack, please visit the website
Who Uses CloudStack?
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There are more than 150 known organizations using Apache CloudStack (or a commercial distribution of CloudStack). Our users include many major service providers running CloudStack to offer public cloud services, product vendors who incorporate or integrate with CloudStack in their own products, organizations who have used CloudStack to build their own private clouds, and systems integrators that offer CloudStack related services.
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See our case studies highlighting successful deployments of Apache CloudStack.
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See the up-to-date list of current users.
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If you are using CloudStack in your organization and your company is not listed above, please complete our brief adoption survey. We're happy to keep your company name anonymous if you require.
Getting Started
- Download a released version
- Build from source with the instructions in the INSTALL.md file.
Getting Source Repository
Apache CloudStack project uses Git. The official Git repository is at:
https://gitbox.apache.org/repos/asf/cloudstack.git
And a mirror is hosted on Github:
https://github.com/apache/cloudstack
The Github mirror is strictly read only and provides convenience to users and developers to explore the code and for the community to accept contributions via Github pull requests.
Links
- Documentation
- Developer wiki
- Release notes
- Design documents
- API documentation
- How to contribute
- Check the YouTube channel for presentations, interviews, and more
Getting Involved and Contributing
Interested in helping out with Apache CloudStack? Great! We welcome participation from anybody willing to work The Apache Way and make a contribution. Note that you do not have to be a developer in order to contribute to Apache CloudStack. We need folks to help with documentation, translation, promotion etc. See our contribution page.
If you're interested in learning more or participating in the Apache CloudStack project, the mailing lists are the best way to do that. While the project has several communications channels, the mailing lists are the most active and the official channels for making decisions about the project itself.
Mailing lists:
- Development Mailing List
- Users Mailing List
- Commits Mailing List
- Issues Mailing List
- Marketing Mailing List
Report and/or check bugs on Github and check our developer page for contributing code.
News and Events
Reporting Security Vulnerabilities
If you've found an issue that you believe is a security vulnerability in a
released version of CloudStack, please report it to security@cloudstack.apache.org with details about the vulnerability, how it
might be exploited, and any additional information that might be useful.
For more details, please visit our security page.
License
Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations under the License.
Please see the LICENSE file included in the root directory of the source tree for extended license details.
Notice of Cryptographic Software
This distribution includes cryptographic software. The country in which you currently reside may have restrictions on the import, possession, use, and/or re-export to another country, of encryption software. BEFORE using any encryption software, please check your country's laws, regulations and policies concerning the import, possession, or use, and re-export of encryption software, to see if this is permitted. See http://www.wassenaar.org/ for more information.
The U.S. Government Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), has classified this software as Export Commodity Control Number (ECCN) 5D002.C.1, which includes information security software using or performing cryptographic functions with asymmetric algorithms. The form and manner of this Apache Software Foundation distribution makes it eligible for export under the License Exception ENC Technology Software Unrestricted (TSU) exception (see the BIS Export Administration Regulations, Section 740.13) for both object code and source code.
The following provides more details on the included cryptographic software:
- CloudStack makes use of JaSypt cryptographic libraries.
- CloudStack has a system requirement of MySQL, and uses native database encryption functionality.
- CloudStack makes use of the Bouncy Castle general-purpose encryption library.
- CloudStack can optionally interact with and control OpenSwan-based VPNs.
- CloudStack has a dependency on and makes use of JSch - a java SSH2 implementation.